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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of oil revenues on the Iranian economy over the
past hundred years, spanning the period 19082010. It is shown that although oil has
been produced in Iran over a very long period, its importance in the Iranian economy
was relatively small up until the early 1960s. It is argued that oil income has been both
a blessing and a curse. Oil revenues when managed appropriately are a blessing, but
their volatility (which in Iran is much higher than oil price volatility) can have adverse
e¤ects on real output, through excessively high and persistent levels of ination. Lack
of appropriate institutions and policy mechanisms which act as shock absorbers in the
face of high levels of oil revenue volatility have also become a drag on real output. In
order to promote growth, policies should be devised to control ination; to serve as
shock absorbers negating the adverse e¤ects of oil revenue volatility; to reduce rent
seeking activities; and to prevent excessive dependence of government nances on oil
income.
JEL Classications: E02, N15, Q32.
Key Words: Oil price volatility, oil income, rent seeking, ination, macroeconomic
policy.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the impact of oil revenues on the Iranian economy over the past hundred
years, spanning the period 19082010. It begins with an overview of the history of oil
exploration and development in Iran, and considers the quantitative importance of revenues
from oil exports for the Iranian economy over the period 19082010. In this regard, three
sub-periods are identied.
In the rst sub-period, 19081959, oil started to be produced in signicant quantities,
but Irans share of prots from exports of oil remained rather limited, despite repeated
renegotiations over the oil contracts between the Iranian government and the international
(mainly British) oil companies, the nationalization of the oil industry, and the subsequent
establishment of the National Iranian Oil Company.
The second sub-period, 19601978, saw major changes in the international oil industry
and expanding oil revenues for Iran. Irans revenues from oil exports started to become
signicant, more or less steadily, from 1960 onwards thanks to increased production and
better royalty terms made possible partly due to the increasing importance of OPEC in
contract re-negotiations between producers and host companies. But the main factor behind
Irans huge oil revenues in 1970s was price increases, which were modest initially but then
became substantial after the quadrupling of international oil prices in 197374.
The third sub-period, 19792010, coincide with the overthrow of the Shahs regime in
the February 1979 Revolution, the halving of oil exports as an intended policy change by
the Revolutionary government, and signicant volatilities in Irans oil revenues due to the
eight-year war with Iraq (September 1980 to August 1988), US economic sanctions (targeting
Irans oil and gas industry), and the vagaries of international oil markets.
In short, although oil has been produced in Iran for a long time, its importance for the
development of the Iranian economy was relatively small until the 1960s. The quadrupling of
oil prices in the 1970s and the Shahs policy of spending almost all of the increased revenues
domestically substantially increased the countrys dependence on oil income, which also
happened to coincide with a much higher volatility of international oil prices. Revolution,
war and economic sanctions, through their impacts on oil production and exports, have
introduced further important sources of variation in Irans oil revenues. As a result, the
Iranian economy has been subject to unprecedented oil revenue volatility. Annual oil revenue
volatility has risen from 35.5% per annum during 19601978, to 51.1% per annum during
19792010, as compared to oil price volatility which rose from 11.3% to 26.1% over the same
periods.
In this paper we argue that it is the volatility in oil revenues and the governments in-
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appropriate economic and political responses to these volatilities that are the curse and not
the abundance of revenues from oil exports in itself. To this end we review the literature
on resource abundance and growth, as well as the recent macro-econometric evidence on
the Iranian economy. Although the early literature showed the existence of a negative re-
lationship between real output per capita and resource abundance, more recent evidence is
not so clear cut. Firstly, the early literature used cross-country analysis that fails to take
account of dynamic heterogeneity and error cross-sectional dependence, and this could bias
the results. Secondly, the early analysis ignores the e¤ects of oil revenue volatility on growth,
which turns out to be important. Using appropriate econometric techniques and including
measures of resource revenue volatility in the analysis, the evidence in fact points to resource
revenues having a positive e¤ect on growth, with resource volatility a¤ecting growth nega-
tively. Seen from this perspective, resource revenues can be both a blessing and a curse, and
the overall outcome very much depends on the way the negative e¤ects of resource revenue
volatility are countered by use of suitable stabilization funds and other policy mechanisms
that smooth out the ow of government expenses over time. There are also a number of
political economy considerations that are highlighted, such as government accountability,
generous subsidy policy, and general rent-seeking activities that often manifest themselves
in higher ination and reduced economic e¢ ciencies.
Turning to the macro-econometric evidence, we rst review the historical trends over the
period 19372010. We show that there are strong positive correlations between growth of
real GDP and real oil export revenues over the whole period and a number of di¤erent sub-
periods. But, at the same time, we observe strong negative correlations between real GDP
growth and ination, again over the full sample period and the same sub-periods. These
results are corroborated by the more formal macro-econometric evidence, also reviewed in
the paper. We note that, whilst oil revenues a¤ect real output positively, ination has
a statistically signicant negative e¤ect on real output even in the long-run. Based on
standard economic theory we would expect ination to have a signicant positive e¤ect on
real output only in the short run (through the Phillips curve trade-o¤), and no e¤ects on
real output in the long run. We view the negative long-run relationship between real output
and ination as an indication of the adverse e¤ects of a combination of factors (such as rent-
seeking, poor institutional arrangements for dealing with oil revenue volatility, and general
economic mismanagement) on economic growth.
Econometric analysis also reveals additional insights into the way the Iranian economy
functions, which is not apparent from a historical analysis. Using generalized impulse re-
sponse analysis it is shown that the e¤ects of oil revenue or foreign output shocks work
themselves out through the economy within two years, which is much shorter in duration
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than what is generally obtained (3-5 years) in the more developed economies. Such rapid
responses to shocks could be due to the relatively underdeveloped nature of money and
capital markets in Iran, and the countrys relative isolation from the global economic and
nance community. Such a fast rate of response to shocks makes it even more important that
appropriate stabilization policies are put into e¤ect so that the adverse e¤ects of negative
shocks on output and consumption are dealt with in a timely manner.
We conclude that, in order to promote growth, policies should be devised to control
ination, serve as shock absorbers negating the adverse e¤ects of oil revenue volatility, re-
duce rent seeking activities, and prevent excessive dependence of government nances on oil
income.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 discusses the history of the oil sector
and its importance for the Iranian economy during the three sub-periods: 1908-1959, 1960-
1978, and 1979-2010. Section 3 reviews the literature on resource abundance and growth,
and discusses the relevance of the "Dutch disease" and the "resource curse" literature to Iran.
Section 4 considers the macroeconomic trends and reviews the existing macro-econometric
evidence on the relationship between oil income, ination and economic growth, both over
the course of a business cycle as well as in the long-run. Section 5 presents the evidence on
oil price and revenue volatilities and discuss how they interact and inuence the economy.
Some concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 Importance of the Oil Sector in the Iranian Economy
It is now over one hundred years since oil was discovered in Iran in commercial quantities. But
as we shall see, oil export revenues started to play an important role in the Iranian economy
only after 1960, largely due to the low levels of royalties that the Iranian government received
from foreign oil companies operating in Iran before 1954. The period post 1960 can also be
conveniently split into the pre and post-revolution periods. More specically, we group the
years since 1908 into three sub-periods: 19081959, 19601978, and 19792010, and consider
each of these periods separately below.
2.1 19081959
In 1901 William Knox DArcy signed an agreement (which became known as the DArcy
Concession) with Muza¤ar al-Din, the Shah of Iran, in which DArcy was given the exclusive
rights to explore, develop and produce any oil and gas elds in an area that covered three
quarters of the country. In exchange for this right, the Shah would receive a lump sum
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payment of £ 20,000 in cash and an equal amount worth of shares of the company that was
granted the right to explore oil in Iran. More importantly, the Shah would also receive 16
percent of net annual prots of the company (Article 10 of the DArcy Concession 1901
reproduced in Ferrier (1982)).
A large number of test wells were drilled in Iran between 1901 and 1904, and while oil was
discovered, the amounts found were not commercially viable. As DArcy was slowly running
out of money, in order to nance further explorations, he was forced to nd other sources
of funding and nally in 1905 sold most of his right to oil exploration and production to
the Burmah Oil Company. By 1908 the cost of exploration had reached over half a million
pounds without any viable oil elds being discovered. Thus the decision was made to shut
down operations in Iran. Although George Reynolds, the chief explorer in Iran, received a
telegraph from London telling him to stop drilling, he continued exploring for oil until the
order was conrmed by post (Kinzer (2003)).
Before the letter from England reached Reynolds, large amounts of oil was found in
Masjid-i-Suleiman on 26 May 1908. With this discovery a new corporation was formed later
that year called the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC). In 1913, in exchange for secure and
cheap oil supply from APOC, the British government, on the initiative of Winston Churchill,
injected 2 million pounds into the company and in doing so acquired a majority ownership
(51 percent of total shares). Thus in e¤ect APOC controlled all oil operations in Iran and
the interest of the British government and APOC became aligned. This partnership made
sure that the British government became an important player in the Iranian oil industry,
enhancing her sphere of inuence in Iran.
During the rst few years of APOCs operations a massive infrastructure of oil wells and
pipelines were put in place. One of the largest oil reneries in the world (up until the rst
half of the 20th century) was built in Abadan, which enabled APOC to become a major
oil producer in the Persian Gulf region. The main impetus to demand for Iranian oil came
when British Admiralty under Winston Churchill decided to run the British naval eets on
oil instead of coal. This created an important demand for Iranian oil which led to signicant
increases in oil production and exports especially during the First World War. Oil extraction
being merely 5 thousand barrels per day in 1913, reached 33 thousand barrels in 1920, and
over 115 thousand in 1929. In the early years and up until the mid 1920s the majority of the
oil was sold at a discount to the Royal Navy, with whatever remained passed on to consumers
in Britain and elsewhere in the world.
However, while oil production had increased by 23-fold between 1914 and 1929, the
royalties to the Iranian government had increased by less than 5-fold. According to the
DArcy concession these royalties were calculated as 16 percent of net prots of the company.
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However, given the massive increase in oil production at the end of the 1920s and with it
the soaring prots of APOC, the manner in which Irans entitlement of net prots were
calculated became questionable and Reza Shah raised concerns that APOC was falsifying
its accounts (Kinzer (2003)). Note that at no point before 1929 did the revenue from APOC
exceeded 19 percent of the total Iranian government revenues (Ferrier (1982)). Moreover,
the share of government revenue from oil exports to the total oil export revenue by APOC
was between 5.3 and 6.5 percent over the years 19201929, see Table 1. This table also shows
that the companys taxes to the British government was larger than the royalties paid to
the Iranian government between 19141924, while the latter was marginally larger than the
former between 1924 and 1929.
Employment generating e¤ect of the oil industry was also very limited, and at its peak
before nationalization in 1949 amounted to 78,162 Iranian nationals, most of whom were
unskilled workers (see Table 14.1 in Bamberg (1994)). This gure included both those
directly employed by the Company as well as indirectly by contractors working on Company
projects.
Table 1: Iranian Royalties and Taxation vs British Taxation, 19141950
Iranian Royalties Ratio of Iranian Government
Years and Taxation British Taxation to Total Oil Export Revenue
(in million £ ) (in million £ ) (in percent)
1914 - 1919 0.22 0.23 -
1920 - 1924 0.52 0.76 5.3
1925 - 1929 1.05 0.87 6.3
1930 - 1934 1.63 1.32 17.2
1935 - 1939 3.19 2.38 18.4
1940 - 1944 4.09 11.18 15.2
1945 - 1949 8.50 22.66 10.7
1950 16.03 51.40 8.1
Note: The gures are averaged over the years considered.
Source: Royalties and taxation data is from Ferrier (1982) and Bamberg (1994), while government and total
revenue data is from Esfahani and Pesaran (2009).
As already noted, the most important customer of APOC in the early years was the
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British government, which in July 1914 had requested that at least 6 million tons of fuel oil
should be supplied to the Admiralty over a 20 year period, with this amount being larger in
the event of a war. The Royal Navy received between 66 and 69 percent of APOCs total
rened oil during the rst World War, but even in 1919 and 1920 had over 53 percent of its
total fuel oil supplied by the company (Ferrier (1982)). As set out in the DArcy concession
the oil sold by APOC to the Royal Navy was at a discount and so the benets of the British
government from the Company was much larger than the amount of taxes reported in Table
1. Thus in the period from initial extraction up until 1929, the amount of revenues generated
by oil production for the Iranian government was not signicant and in most years amounted
to less than 19 percent of total Iranian government revenues.
Negotiations to revise the concession of 1901, due to the growing concerns about the way
in which Irans royalties were calculated, took place between the Iranian government and
the company throughout 19281932, which culminated in Reza Shah cancelling the DArcy
Concession in 1932. However, in 1933 Reza Shah signed a new agreement which extended the
DArcy Concession, due to expire in 1961, up to the end of 1993. The new agreement resulted
in a reduction of 80 percent of the total area granted for exploration and extraction by the
1901 concession, although APOC would choose the 100,000 square miles that it would keep,
see Bamberg (1994). But most importantly royalties were now based on actual volumes (tons
of oil produced) rather than prots. Although the agreement took e¤ect from January 1933,
the royalties of 1931 and 1932 were recalculated, with the 1931 payment being increased by
4-fold; from £ 306,383 (based on 16 percent of net prots) to £ 1,339,132 (based on volume).
For further details see Ferrier (1982).
Although, the change in calculation of Irans royalties from oil production led to a large
increase in Iranian oil income between 1930 and 1950, with oil production increasing from
126 to 648 thousand barrels per day, British taxes throughout the period 19401950 were
more than twice as much as the royalties that were paid to Iran by AIOC as can be seen
from Table 1.1
After a series of disputes between the Iranian government and the AIOC during the
1940s, the Iranian oil industry was nationalized in 1951, through a mandate given by the
Iranian parliament, Majles, to Prime Minister Mossadegh. The nationalization caused the
production of oil, and thus government revenues, to fall dramatically. During the years 1952
& 1953 only 28 thousand barrels per day were produced on average, which was around 4
percent of the level of oil production which was achieved in 1950. Although this was partly
due to the lack of technical skills as all British personnel had left the country, the main reason
for the large slow down in production was the British governments embargo on Iranian oil
1In 1935 the APOC was re-named as the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC),
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and seizure of any oil tanker that tried to do business with the Iranian government.
One of the reasons for the nationalization was that Mossadegh and others felt that prots
from the oil industry were not impacting the Iranian economy or the countrys development
due to the relative small percentage of the total oil revenues that the Iranian government
actually received. In a speech to the United Nations Security Council on 15 October 1951,
Mossadegh declared that "the petroleum industry has contributed nothing to well-being
of the people or to the technological progress or industrial development of my country"
(United Nations (1951)).
The negotiations between the British and Iranian governments throughout 195153 did
not result in any concrete progress, and eventually the British could see no way out other
than to remove Mossadegh, and accordingly initiated and backed a successful coup against
Mossadeghs government nanced and organized by CIA in August 1953.2 The end of the
Mossadegh era meant that negotiations could open between the new pro-Western Iranian
government of Prime Minister Fazlollah Zahedi and the British as well as the Americans.
The negotiations resulted in the formation of the 1954 Consortium Agreement which gave the
rights of extracting petroleum in the 100,000 square mile area covered by the 1933 Concession
to a Consortium of eight European and American companies. 40 percent of the shares of
the Consortium was allocated to British Petroleum (BP), which AIOC had been renamed
earlier, 14 percent to Royal Dutch Shell, 6 percent to Compagnie Française des Pétroles
(CFP), with the remaining 40 percent to be split equally between ve American companies
(Exxon, Gulf Oil, Mobil, Socony, and Standard Oil of California). Under the new agreement
Iran would share the prots from the oil production with the Consortium members on a
50-50 basis, which was the agreement that most Middle Eastern countries had with foreign
oil companies, but have no say in the administration of the Consortium, see Dean (2004)
and NIOC (2011). In 1955 oil production had increased to 353 thousand barrels per day and
by 1959 reached the level of 951 thousands barrels per day, which was 50 percent more than
the level of production in the pre-nationalization period.
On the external side, although oil exports formed a large part of total exports (51 percent
on average between 1936 and 1959, see Esfahani and Pesaran (2009)), due to the royalty
system in place, Irans share of foreign exchange receipts from oil exports was relatively
small, and non-oil exports continued to be the dominant factor in balancing Irans external
account.
2For an extensive discussion of the coup see Elm (1992), Gasiorowski (1987), Kinzer (2003), and Pesaran
(2011).
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2.2 19601978
As can be seen from Figure 1 oil production increased signicantly from 1960 onwards as
compared to the earlier period. By 1961 over 1.2 million barrels of oil per day were being
produced, which was twice as much as the pre-nationalization peak in 1950 (0.6 millions).
Oil production increased at a steady rate between 1960 and 1973 and peaked in 1974 at
6 million barrels per day before dropping slightly in the following years before the 1979
Revolution.3
Figure 1: Oil Production (in millions of barrels per day), 19132010
0
2
4
6
8
1913 1938 1963 1988 2010
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin.
Figure 2 also shows the ratio of total oil export revenues to domestic output, which peaked
at 23 percent in 1950 just before nationalization. Despite this, due to the unfavourable
terms with the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, only 8.1 percent of the total oil export revenues
were actually received by the Iranian government in terms of taxes and royalties (Table 1).
However, with the Consortium agreement of 1954, the Iranian government was entitled to
50 percent of the total net prots from oil production, therefore, the signicant increase
in production during these two decades meant that government revenues from oil exports
started to rise signicantly and steadily. Consequently, the ratio of oil export revenues to
GDP rose to 47 percent by 1974. Therefore, oils role in the Iranian economy, although
muted during 19081959, became gradually more and more important between 1960 and
1978.
3See Pesaran (1985) for a discussion of macroeconomic trends in Iran between 1954 and 1979.
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Figure 2: Ratios of Oil Export Revenues to Real Output, Total Exports, and
Government Expenditure, 19452010
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Ratio of oil export revenues to government expenditure (right scale)
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, and Esfahani and Pesaran
(2009).
Although signicant increases in oil production had been achieved during the 1954-1975
period, this was not the only factor driving the Iranian oil export revenues and domestic
output. Another important factor was oil prices. With the foundation of the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960, oil prices which had been falling in real
terms since 1920 started to stabilize (Figure 3).4 Following the Yom Kippur War, and the
decision by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) excluding
Iraq to introduce production cutbacks as well as an embargo against USA and Netherlands,
international oil prices quadrupled in 1973-74. Real oil prices then stabilized over the period
1975 to 1978.
Figure 4 shows a close positive relationship between real output and oil revenues. The
relationship is particularly strong during the post 1960 period when oil revenues started to
rise signicantly and were sustained over a prolonged period. The quadrupling of oil prices
in 197374 presented Iran with a substantial, largely unexpected, increase in oil revenues.
A prudent economic management of such large external funds would suggests a gradual and
planned infusion of the new oil revenues into the Iranian economy. The remaining funds
could have been invested abroad for future use and as a bu¤er against weak global economic
4For an early history of the OPEC see Rouhani (1979) and for an extensive survey of di¤erent models
emphasising the oil market as being non-competitive and the role of the OPEC as a price maker during this
period see Crémer and Salehi-Isfahani (1991).
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Figure 3: International Price of Oil per barrel, 19132010
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Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy.
conditions and lower oil prices. Such a policy was discussed in a critical meeting of tech-
nocrats and policy makers in Gajereh, but was atly rejected by the Shah who insisted on
spending almost all of the increased oil revenues domestically and over a relatively short
period. This resulted in an excessive expansion of aggregate demand, which could not be
matched by increased supply, even from imports, due to limited port and road capacities and
other infrastructure limitations and bottlenecks. As a result ination started to rise rapidly,
and heavy-handed tactics of the government by arrest and imprisonment of merchants and
industrialists only resulted in political and economic alienation without any permanent suc-
cess at curbing ination. See, for example Pesaran (1997). The rapid expansion of the
economy also resulted in higher expectations which could not be fullled, and amplied the
structural weaknesses of the regime and was one of the major factors behind the mass dis-
content that erupted in 1977-78 which led to the February 1979 Revolution and the downfall
of the Pahlavi regime.
2.3 19792010
Upon seizing power, the Provisional Government of Mehdi Bazargan decided to reduce oil
production from its height of 6 million barrels to around 4 million barrels per day. Although
the revolutionary upheavals and the strikes by oil workers had halted oil production, it was
the conscious decision by the Provisional Government to reduce the level of oil production
10
Figure 4: Real Ouput and Oil Production Revenues, 19482010
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin.
to around 30 percent below its average level over the 1971-78 period. See Salehi-Isfahani
(1996) and Figure 1.5 This was the rst time that an Iranian government had managed
to control the level of her oil production, and the 1973 agreement between the Consortium
and National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), which bound Iran to production and sales at a
discount to the Consortium, was cancelled in March 1979 (see Dean (2004)).
During the pre-revolutionary period, the Shahs oil policy was heavily criticized, and in
mass demonstrations people called for the conservation of the countrys oil resources. The
high levels of oil production were seen as responsible for waste, corruption and the relative
decline of the agricultural sector (Hakimian (1988)). It was argued that oil production and
income need to be reduced substantially if the agricultural and industrial sectors were to
ourish. As it turned out, the invasion of Iran by Iraq in 1980, reduced oil production
and rening capacity signicantly. Technical di¢ culties and the start of the war with Iraq
made the initial cut in production inspired by revolutionary ideals a permanent feature and
production did not reach the post-revolution target of 4 million barrels per day until much
later in 2003. The following eight years of war, meant that Iran had to live with a much
reduced levels of oil production, by choice initially and by circumstances as the result of the
war.
However, despite these production cutbacks oil revenues continued to form a large part
5See also Karshenas and Hakimian (2005), Karshenas and Hakimian (2007) and Pesaran (2000) for a
discussion of economic trends and macroeconomic policies in the post-revolutionary Iran.
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of the countrys foreign exchange receipts and government revenues. The ratio of oil exports
to domestic output declined somewhat and uctuated around 12 percent between 1979 and
1988 before starting to rise slowly with the end of the Iran-Iraq war (Figure 2). The 1979
revolution, the eight year Iran-Iraq war, and the US economic sanctions imposed on Iran,
whilst reducing Irans oil revenues also resulted in falling or at best stagnant real output,
which has taken almost 30 years to return to its pre-revolution levels (Figure 4).6
Although agricultural production increased after the revolution, agricultural exports did
not increase signicantly. This was mainly due to the rapid population growth of the 1980s,
which meant that most of the increased agricultural production was absorbed by the higher
domestic demand for food. As a result, the role of oil exports and food imports in the Iranian
economy remained as high as they had been before the revolution.
Figure 5: Per capita Oil Export Revenues, 19132010
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin.
Looking at Figure 5a we see that in nominal terms oil export revenues per capita, having
dropped signicantly after the revolution and during the eight years of war, has been in-
creasing rapidly since 2003. Having peaked at $1209 in 2008, it fell to around $795 in 2010.
However, correcting for ination we see that in real terms oil export revenues per capita
peaked in 1974 at $2558 (in 2009 US dollar), whilst in 2010 it had fallen to $715, or about
40 percent lower than its peak before the revolution (Figure 5b). Therefore, although the
total amount of export revenues has increased over time, this is not so once the e¤ects of
rising population is taken into account.
Figure 5b also shows the relative importance of oil in the Iranian economy since 1913.
Taking into account the percentage of total oil export revenues that the Iranian government
actually received in royalties and taxes (Table 1), oil export revenues per capita was not
6Karshenas and Hakimian (2005) also show that the technological gap between Iran and the rest of the
world (Korea, Malaysia, and Turkey) has widened since 1979.
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more than $25 before 1954 and well below $85 after the Consortium agreement in 1954,
which signicantly increased Irans take of prots from oil production. There is a clear
divide between the period before and after 1960, and it is from 1960 onwards that oil started
to play a signicant role in the Iranian economy.
A further factor which had a major impact on Irans oil export revenues was introduced in
early 1970s when oil prices were no longer administratively determined by the so-called Seven
Sisters,7 and begun to be determined in international markets. This in turn introduced a
signicant degree of volatility in prices, as compared to the remarkable stability of oil prices
during the earlier periods, particularly in the 1960s (Figure 3).
To summarize, although oil has been produced in Iran for over 100 years, the importance
of oil in the development of the Iranian economy had been relatively small up until the 1960s
(Table 1). The surge in oil prices in 1970s and the Shahs insistence on injecting almost all
of the increased oil revenues into the economy further enhanced the countrys dependence
on oil income. This increased dependence coincided with a higher volatility of international
oil prices. The e¤ects of price volatility on oil revenues were further accentuated due to the
volatile e¤ects of revolution, war, and economic sanctions on oil production and exports. As
a result the Iranian economy is faced with the problem of how to deal with substantial but
highly volatile oil revenues. In the rest of this paper we argue that it is the volatility in oil
export revenues and governmentsinappropriate economic and political responses to these
volatilities which is the curse and not the abundance of revenues from oil exports in itself.
3 Resource Abundance and Growth
Most papers in the growth literature do not include major oil exporting economies in their
cross-country empirical analysis. The literature that specically deals with resource abun-
dant economies tends to focus on short-term e¤ects of unexpected gains that ow from the
resource discovery, which are viewed as intrinsically temporary(van der Ploeg and Venables
(2009)). In this section we provide an overview of three prominent strands of the resource
curse literature and examine their relevance to our understanding of the Iranian economy.
3.1 The Dutch Disease
A number of early studies considered the macroeconomic e¤ects of the resource discovery and
focussed on the Dutch diseasephenomenon rst experienced in Netherlands after the large,
7Anglo-Persian Oil (British Petroleum), Gulf Oil, Royal Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of California (Socal),
Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso), Standard Oil of New York (Socony), and Texaco.
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but short-lived, discovery of gas in the 1960s. The Dutch disease states that an exogenous
unexpected increase in foreign exchange revenues from the resource discovery will result in
a real exchange rate appreciation and a fall in output and employment of the non-resource
traded goods sector, often manufacturing. Therefore, discovering natural resources is viewed
as a curse for economic development. See, for example, Corden and Neary (1982), Krugman
(1987), and Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986) among others. However, the Dutch disease
by itself need not have adverse long-run implications for the economy as a whole. One would
expect the economy to re-adjust once the revenues from the resource are diminished or vanish
altogether, unless there are important non-convexities or imperfections in the economy. For
example, if the manufacturing sector is subject to economies of scale or learning by doing,
the loss of manufacturing capacity will be very costly to reverse.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the evolution of real oil prices and real exchange
rate over the period 19452010. Note that since the exchange rate is measured in terms of
the number of rials per US dollar, a rise (fall) in the real exchange rate series indicates real
depreciation (appreciation). The relationship between the two series is quite complicated.
They tend to move in opposite direction in the short run, but not over the long run. There
are also periods that the two series are basically at. For example, over the period 19631973,
when GDP per capita growth rate averaged 8.2 percent per annum (Figure 4) coupled with
low levels of ination, the real exchange rate and oil prices did not change much. However,
with the quadrupling of oil prices in 197374, while the Iranian oil revenues were rising in real
terms (Figure 5b), the real exchange rate also started to appreciate. This process continued
until the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 after which oil prices started to fall with the real
exchange rate depreciating. Figure 6 also shows that the real exchange rate appreciated with
the oil price boom in 2003 and the subsequent oil price increases.
In short, whilst the Dutch disease theory seems to hold in the short run, over the course of
a given business cycle, the same cannot be said about the secular trends in the real oil prices
and real exchange rates. Seen from the long-term perspective both series are trending upward
over the whole period from 1945 to 2010. This is contrary to the prediction of the theory,
which is more appropriate in the short run. The secular trend in the real exchange rate
is determined by many factors beside the price of natural resources. For instance, political
factors inuence the way oil revenues are spent in the economy, whether the revenues are
used for consumption or investment, and the management of the economy in general. In
particular, policy responses to the volatile nature of oil prices seem to play an important
role in this process.
The Dutch disease phenomenon is applicable to economies that have been subject to
sudden unexpected income ows from resource discoveries that are temporary and are not
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Figure 6: Real Oil Prices and the Real Exhange Rate, 19452010
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Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy and IMF International Financial Statistics.
expected to last that long. It is less relevant to economies such as Iran, where oil income
has been, and is expected, to be an important feature of the economy for a long period to
come. As we have seen, since 1960 oil has formed a large part of government nances and
countrys foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, even after 100 years of exploration and
production, current estimated reserve-to-extraction ratio in Iran suggests a further 87 years
of oil production. In addition, Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves after Russia,
around 60 percent of which is yet to be developed.8 Although, it is clear that Irans oil and
gas reserves will be exhausted eventually, this is likely to take place over a relatively long
period. In fact over the past two decades, even with low oil prices between 19902002, the
ratio of Irans oil export revenues to GDP has been on average 19 percent (Figure 2). Of
course, Iran is not unique in this regard. As Figure 7 shows most other Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Algeria, United
Arab Emirates and Kuwait, and a few countries outside OPEC such as Norway and Russia
have similar oil income GDP ratios that have remained relatively stable (and in some cases
have even been rising as in Norway). Therefore, there is little evidence to suggest that in
these economies oil income will be diminishing any time soon.
8See, for example, Amuzegar (2008) and British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy.
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Figure 7: Ratio of Oil Export Revenues to Real Output Across Oil Exporters,
19802010
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Source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, and IMF
International Financial Statistics.
3.2 The Resource Curse
According to the resource curse hypothesis, resource rich countries perform poorly when
compared to countries which are not endowed with oil, natural gas, minerals and other
non-renewable resources. Therefore, resource abundance is believed to be an important
determinant of economic failure, which implies that oil abundance is a curse and not a
blessing. Empirical support for the resource curse was originally provided by Sachs and
Warner (1995) who showed the existence of a negative relationship between real GDP growth
per capita and di¤erent measures of resource abundance, such as the ratio of resource exports
to GDP. This nding is clearly paradoxical and has led to a growing theoretical and empirical
literature.
However, the empirical evidence on the resource curse paradox is rather mixed. Most
papers in the literature tend to follow Sachs andWarners cross-sectional specication but try
new measures for the resource dependence/abundance variable. See, for example, Rodriguez
and Sachs (1999), Gylfason et al. (1999), and Bulte et al. (2005). The results could be
quite sensitive to the measure of resource abundance employed. Sachs and Warner (1995),
for instance, use the ratio of primary-product exports to GDP in the initial period as a
measure of resource abundance. But as pointed out by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008),
this ratio measures resource dependence rather than resource abundance. The latter should
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be introduced in the growth regressions as the stock or the ow of natural resources. In their
study, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue that the evidence in favour of the resource
curse hypothesis is non-existent or at best weak, if the correct measure of resource abundance
is used. They also show that while resource dependence, when instrumented in growth
regressions, does not a¤ect growth, resource abundance in fact positively a¤ects economic
growth.
There are also a number of other reasons why the econometric evidence on the negative
e¤ects of resource abundance on output growth might be questioned. Firstly, the literature
relies primarily on a cross-sectional approach to test the resource curse hypothesis, and as
such does not fully take account of the time dimension of the data. Secondly, a cross-
sectional growth regression augmented with the resource abundance variable could su¤er
from endogeneity and omitted variable problems, and this is perhaps the most important
reason for being skeptical about the econometric studies suggesting a positive or negative
association between resource abundance and growth. For example, Alexeev and Conrad
(2009) show evidence against the resource curse hypothesis by considering a few additional
regressors, such as exogenous geographical factors.
In addition, even when panel data techniques are used most studies make use of homo-
geneous panel data models, such as xed and random e¤ects estimators, the instrumental
variable (IV) technique proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Anderson and Hsiao
(1982), and the generalized methods of moments (GMM) model of Arellano and Bond (1991),
Arellano and Bover (1995), among others.9 While homogeneous panel data models allow the
intercepts to di¤er across countries all slope parameters are constrained to be the same.
Therefore, a high degree of homogeneity is still imposed. As discussed in Pesaran and Smith
(1995), the problem with these dynamic panel data techniques, when applied to testing
growth e¤ects, is that they can produce inconsistent and potentially very misleading esti-
mates of the average values of the parameters, since growth regressions typically exhibit a
substantial degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity.
In view of the above considerations Cavalcanti et al. (2011a) adopt the common corre-
lated e¤ects (CCE) estimator recently developed in Pesaran (2006) and estimate dynamic
heterogeneous panel data models with interactive e¤ects. The approach takes account of
the institutional and geographical di¤erences that exist across countries and unlike the stan-
dard FE estimator allows the coe¢ cients of the growth regressions to di¤er across countries.
The CCE estimator also takes account of error cross-sectional dependence (again ignored
by the FE estimator) by augmenting the growth regressions with cross-sectional averages of
9For a comprehensive survey of the econometric methods employed in the growth literature, and some of
their shortcomings, see Durlauf et al. (2005) and Durlauf et al. (2009).
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the variables included in the regressions.10 Such multi-factor processes have been used in
the literature to model the e¤ects of unobserved factors such as technological innovation,
political and institutional developments that are di¢ cult to measure, and factors that a¤ect
the degree of openness of economies. It is clearly important that such e¤ects are also taken
into account in estimation of growth regressions; otherwise the estimates of the e¤ects of
resource abundance on growth could be seriously biased.
Cavalcanti et al. (2011a) base their analysis on a panel of 53 countries (including Iran)
over the period 19802006, and estimate the heterogeneous growth regressions by the CCE
estimator. To check for the robustness of their results they consider three di¤erent proxies
measuring resource abundance, namely the real value of oil production, the rent component
of oil income, and oil reserves. They conclude that oil abundance is in fact a blessing and
not a curse in the long run as well as in the short run, and challenge the consensus view that
oil abundance a¤ects economic growth negatively.11
The positive e¤ect of resource abundance on development and growth is also supported
by Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007), Cavalcanti et al. (2012), Esfahani et al. (2012b),
Leong and Mohaddes (2011), and van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010). Therefore, using
appropriate econometric techniques the recent empirical literature seems to provide evidence
against the conventional resource curse literature, which argues for an unconditional negative
relationship between resource income and growth.
3.3 Political Economy Considerations
Although the growth enhancing e¤ect of oil income is now generally accepted, the volatility
of oil income presents important policy challenges with political economy considerations that
must be taken into account. As was noted earlier, Irans revenues form oil exports have been
even more volatile than international oil prices, due to revolution, war and economic sanc-
tions. Such volatilities tend to a¤ect economic growth negatively. To deal with the adverse
e¤ects of oil price volatility, some of the major oil exporters have set up oil stabilization or
sovereign wealth funds. The success of such funds depends on the funds political ownership
(management and right of access), and the mechanisms governing the allocation of the pro-
ceeds from the fund to the government and other political bodies. In the case of Iran an Oil
Stabilization Fund was set up under Khatamis Presidency but was closed down by President
Ahmadinejad in favour of a National Development Fund which shifted the political power
from the Parliament to the President.
10Di¤erent forms of cross-section dependence are discussed and formally dened in Pesaran and Tosetti
(2011).
11See also Cavalcanti et al. (2011b).
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Another important political economy consideration is rent-seeking activities that are
primarily initiated due to the existence of large oil incomes. In the case of oil exporting
countries the problem of rent seeking has been discussed by Mahdavi (1970), Amuzegar
and Fekrat (1972), and Pesaran (1982). The accrual of large income from oil exports to the
government also reduces government accountability, mainly because the government does not
need to rely on taxation, tend to induce government intervention in the economy motivated
more by short-term crises rather than long-term development perspectives, and encourages
and sustains populistspolicies longer than would have otherwise been possible. Finally,
large oil revenues can promote dictatorship and lead to a system of dependent capitalism
where the economic activities of the private sector is also dependent on active government
support (Pesaran (1982)). States dependence on oil revenues in turn makes it politically
less accountable.
The more recent literature on resource abundance and economic growth focusses on
some of these political economy considerations and argues that large windfalls from oil and
other resources create incentives for rent-seeking activities that involve corruption (Mauro
(1995) and Leite and Weidmann (1999)), voracity (Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell
and Lane (1999)), and possibly civil conicts (Collier and Hoe­ er (2004)). Some of these
considerations have been recently formalized by Caselli and Cunningham (2009), with a
recent survey provided in van der Ploeg and Venables (2009).
A number of recent empirical work have also focused on the role of institutions. Mehlum
et al. (2006) and Béland and Tiagi (2009), using a cross-sectional approach, show that the
impact of natural resources on growth and development depends primarily on institutions,
while Boschini et al. (2007) illustrate that the type of natural resources possessed is also an
important factor. These authors argue that controlling for institutional quality and including
an interaction term between institutional quality and resource abundance a threshold e¤ect
arises. This suggests there are levels of institutional quality above which resource abundance
becomes growth enhancing.
Political economy and institutional factors are clearly very important for a proper evalua-
tion of the e¤ects of oil income on the Iranian economy. However, an empirical investigation
of these issues is complicated. It is di¢ cult to obtain accurate measurements of rent-seeking
activities and institutional quality, and most attempts made in the literature in this regard
tend to use proxy measures that are highly correlated with oil revenues, thus making it im-
possible to separate the possible positive e¤ects of oil income on growth from the negative
e¤ects of rent-seeking and poor institutional quality. An alternative approach that we follow
in the rest of the paper is to consider the overall macroeconomic e¤ects of oil income and
domestic ination on real output in the long run. In a well managed economy we do not
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expect ination to have a signicant impact on real output in the long run. Ination tends
to have a positive e¤ect on real output in the short run (the Phillips curve e¤ect), but not
in the long run where output is determined by technological and endowment factors. By
focussing on the long-run e¤ects of ination on real output we hope to provide some indirect
evidence on the importance of political economy factors in the case of Iran.
4 Macro-econometric Evidence
We begin with an investigation of the main macroeconomic trends of the Iranian economy
using data on real output, consumption, oil export revenues and ination. Using annual data
over the period 19372010 we investigate the historical relationships that exist between these
variables. We then briey outline the growth model for major oil exporting economies de-
veloped in Esfahani et al. (2012a), and discuss the results of a quarterly macro-econometric
model for Iran estimated over the period 1979Q1- 2006Q4. Interestingly enough, the econo-
metric results in Section 4.2 are in line with the historical analysis that follows.
4.1 Macroeconomic Trends 19372010
Figure 8 depicts the growth rate of per capita real output, private consumption, and oil
export revenues, from which we see that due to the revolution and the Iran-Iraq war both
consumption and GDP have been quite volatile. However, in comparison with the oil revenue
volatility experienced in Iran, these two variables seem relatively stable. Moreover, notice
that as previously mentioned oil revenues are much more volatile than real output and
consumption.
Table 2 shows the growth rates of per capita real output and real oil export revenues
over di¤erent sub-periods. We observe that since 1937 the growth rate of oil export revenues
(denoted by go) has been higher than that of real output (gy), with the two series being
signicantly positively correlated, with a correlation coe¢ cient of around 40% computed
over the period 1960-2010 (see also Figure 4). Moreover, as to be expected, oil export
revenues show a much higher degree of volatility than real output.
But it is important to bear in mind that the relationship between real output and oil ex-
ports is not stable and changes across the di¤erent sub-periods. For instance, over the period
19601978 real output per capita grew on average by 5.48 percent per annum, as compared
to oil revenues which showed a much higher annual average growth rate of around 12.3 per-
cent. These very high growth rates are to be contrasted with those of the post-revolutionary
experience where output grew on average by 0.16 percent per annum, as compared to the
20
Figure 8: Growth Rates of per capita Real Output, Consumption, and Oil Export
Revenues, 19602010
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Source: Central Bank of Iran Economic Time Series Database, IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF
World Economic Outlook, and OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin.
Table 2: Growth of Real Output and Real Oil Export Revenue (per capita),
19372010
Real Output Real Oil Export Revenues
Sample Period per capita Growth per capita Growth Correlation
(in percent) (in percent)
1937 - 2010 2.54 2.80 0.31
1960 - 2010 2.14 2.80 0.47
-
1960 - 1978 5.48 12.30 0.15
-
1979 - 2010 0.16 -2.84 0.53
1988 - 2010 2.20 3.63 0.33
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, and Esfahani and Pesaran (2009).
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negative growth of oil revenues of around -2.84 percent per annum over the period 19791988.
The post-war picture is much more encouraging with output and real oil revenues rising on
average by 2.2 and 3.63 percent per annum, respectively. Despite these di¤erences across the
di¤erent sub-periods, the overall picture points to oil revenues being an important driver of
the Iranian economy.
Figure 9: Real Output Growth and Ination, 19372010
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and IMF World Economic Outlook.
Consider now the relationship between GDP growth and ination as depicted in Figure
9. It is clear that, in general, these two series tend to move in opposite directions. We
also observe that over the whole period (19372010) ination has been quite high at 12.69
percent per annum, whilst output growth averaged around 4.96 percent per annum (Table
3). Once again the high growth years of 19601978 proved to be an exception, where high
output growth in fact coincided with a relatively low ination. The average annual rate
of ination over this sub-period was less than half of the ination rate experienced in all
other sub-periods under consideration. More recent evidence also corroborate a negative
relationship between ination and output growth.12
The negative association between the two series is documented in Table 3. Over the
full sample period the correlation coe¢ cient between the two series amounted to -0.39, with
12See also the following articles in Farsi by M. H. Pesaran arguing that controlling the high ination rate
must be one of the most important objectives for the Iranian economy: "Ination: The Most Important Issue
for the Iranian Economy" in Jam-e Jam (May 20, 2012) and "One Needs to Find the Underlying Causes of
Exchange Rate Volatility" in Donya-e Eqtesad (July 2, 2012).
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Table 3: Real Output Growth and Ination, 19372010
Sample Period Real Output Growth Ination Correlation
(in percent) (in percent)
1937 - 2010 4.96 12.69 -0.39
1960 - 2010 4.64 13.08 -0.39
-
1960 - 1978 8.37 6.18 -0.42
-
1979 - 2010 2.42 17.18 -0.14
1988 - 2010 3.82 17.65 -0.40
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF World Economic Outlook, and Esfahani and Pesaran
(2009).
the negative relationship between output growth and ination being apparent in all sub-
periods. This is a di¢ cult result to explain using standard economic theory, which as noted
earlier predicts no long-run relationship between output growth and ination. The only
theoretically justied relationship between output growth and ination is for a positive (and
not a negative) short-term relation, known as the Phillips curve. As already argued, we
view the negative relationship between growth and ination as an indication of rent-seeking
activities, poor institutional arrangements for dealing with oil revenue volatility, and general
economic mismanagement. Although, it is beyond the scope of the present paper to identify
the relative contributions of these factors to the observed negative relationship between
growth and ination, we nevertheless consider our analysis as a rst step towards this aim.
There is also the concern that the correlation analysis of the type o¤ered above, namely
a positive relationship between output growth and oil revenues and a negative relationship
between output growth and ination, might be spurious or could be due to other factors
omitted from our discussion. Furthermore, it is unclear if such correlations are stable and/or
statistically signicant once other determinants of output growth such as technological in-
novation are also taken into account. In what follows we consider these issues using a simple
quarterly econometric model developed for the Iranian economy by Esfahani et al. (2012b).
4.2 A Macro-econometric Model for the Iranian Economy
As outlined in Section 3, most macroeconomic analysis of oil revenues tend to take a short-
term perspective. They usually focus on the e¤ects of oil revenues on the real exchange rate
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(Dutch disease) and government budget expansion, thus failing to consider the e¤ects of oil
revenues on long-run growth. This approach makes sense for countries with a limited amount
of oil reserves, but not for major oil exporting countries such as Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia
for which oil income should be treated more as a part of the steady state growth outcome
and not as a transient state.
To this end Esfahani et al. (2012a) develop a long-run output relation for a major oil
exporting economy where the oil income to output ratio is expected to remain high over a
prolonged period. The stochastic growth model developed in Binder and Pesaran (1999) is
extended to allow for the possibility that a certain fraction of oil export revenues is invested
in the domestic economy via the capital accumulation channel. The long-run output equation
including oil exports is then given by:
yt    1yt =  2(et   pt) +  3xot + cy + yt+ y;t; (1)
where yt (yt ) is the logarithm of real domestic (foreign) output, et is the log of the nominal
exchange rate, pt is the logarithm of the domestic Consumer Price Index (CPI), xot is oil
export revenue in US dollars, cy is a xed constant, and y;t is a mean zero stationary process,
which represents the error correction term of the long-run output equation. As discussed in
Section 2.1 in Esfahani et al. (2012a), the coe¢ cient of the variables in equation (1) have
further restrictions imposed on them based on economic theory, namely:
 1 = (1   2);  2 =  3 = ; and y = (1  )(n  n); (2)
where  is the share of capital in output and  measures the extent to which foreign tech-
nology is di¤used and adapted successfully by the domestic economy in the long run. In this
relationship, yt , acts as a proxy for global technological progress. The di¤usion of technology
is at par with the rest of the world if  = 1, whilst a value of  below unity suggests ine¢ -
ciency that prevents the adoption of best practice techniques, possibly due to rent-seeking
activities and general economic mismanagement. Note that the empirical literature which is
mainly based on cross-section regressions (see Section 3) most likely captures short-term de-
viations from the steady states and in view of the substantial heterogeneity that exists across
countries can be quite misleading, particularly as far as the identication of  is concerned,
which most likely could di¤er across countries.
There is a need to distinguish between two cases where the growth of oil income, go, is
less than the natural growth rate (the sum of the population growth, n, and the growth of
technical progress, g) and when go  g + n. Under the former, the e¤ects of oil income on
the economys steady growth rate will vanish eventually. In such a case, we have  1 =  and
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 2 =  3 = 0. For most of the resource abundant economies, where g
o < g + n, their steady
state growth rates cannot exceed that of the rest of the world unless  > 1. However, when
go  g + n, oil income enters the long-run output equation with a coe¢ cient which is equal
to the share of capital if it is further assumed that the underlying production technology can
be represented as a Cobb-Douglas production function. In this case we have  2 =  3 = .
Esfahani et al. (2012b) examine the empirical validity of the long-run output equation
(1) for the Iranian economy by incorporating it into a vector autoregressive error correction
model (VECX*) augmented with foreign output, yt , treated as a weakly exogenous variable.
13
The foreign output variable is constructed as a weighted average of the log of real output of
Irans trading partners with the weights based on the relative size of their trade with Iran
(exports plus imports). The domestic variables included in the model are real GDP, the rate
of ination computed using the consumer price index (CPI), the o¢ cial and freemarket
exchange rates, and money and quasi money. All variables except for the ination rate are
log-transformed.
The Iranian VECX* model is estimated using quarterly observations over the period
1979Q12006Q4. The estimates support the existence of a long-run relation between domes-
tic output, foreign output, and real oil exports. Therefore, as predicted by the theory, oil
exports contribute to real income through capital accumulation. The estimates also conrm
that Iran has experienced a similar rate of technological progress as its trading partners over
the past three decades ( = 1) and that the share of capital () is about 0.26, which is in line
with the estimates obtained in recent studies for oil exporting economics, see for instance
Cavalcanti et al. (2011a).
However, the estimates also suggest that ination has a statistically signicant negative
e¤ect on real output even in the long-run, and establishes that the negative e¤ect of ination
on output growth observed using the simple correlation techniques cannot be explained away
by allowing for other factors such as money, exchange rates, and technology. The econometric
results provide further evidence of the inherent ine¢ ciencies in the Iranian economy that
show up as high and sustained levels of ination.
The above results seem to be reasonably robust regardless of how foreign output is con-
structed, what measure of the exchange rate is used, and whether a dummy variable for
revolution and war (over the period 1979Q11988Q2) is included in the model. The his-
torical analysis in Section 4.1 and the econometric results in Esfahani et al. (2012b) are
surprisingly in line both when it comes to the growth enhancing e¤ects of oil income and
the growth dampening e¤ects of high ination.
Esfahani et al. (2012b) illustrate the impact of oil export revenues on the Iranian econ-
13See Esfahani et al. (2012b) for a review of earlier work on macroeconomic models for Iran.
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omy, by considering the Generalized Impulse Response Functions of a unit shock (equal to
one standard error) to oil exports. Figure 10 shows that the e¤ects of the shock work them-
selves through the economy within 2 years. As such the Iranian economy adjust very quickly
to shocks when compared to the response rates of other economies, especially the developed
ones. This seems to be due to the limitations of Irans nancial markets that restrict expen-
diture smoothing options and thereby cause the economy to move up and down quickly as
external and internal conditions change. The gures clearly show that a positive unit shock
to oil exports signicantly increases ination, strengthens the real exchange rate (et   pt),
increases real output signicantly (by 3.2 percent), but its e¤ect on real money balances,
whilst positive, is not statistically signicant. The real exchange rate appreciation of around
7.6 percent in the aftermath of the positive shock to oil exports can be viewed as supporting
the Dutch disease, although here the rise in the real exchange rate is in fact accompanied
with a rise in real output which does not sit comfortably with those that view the Dutch
disease as a resource curse.
Figure 10: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive One Standard Deviation
Shock to Oil Export Revenues (with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds)
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Source: Esfahani et al. (2012b).
Esfahani et al. (2012a) also test the empirical validity of the long-run theory on eight
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other major oil exporting economies, with a variety of development experiences and political
systems, showing that the long-run output equation (1) applies equally to OPEC (Kuwait,
Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela), former OPEC (Indonesia), and OECD (Mex-
ico and Norway) oil exporters. For most OPEC members, not surprisingly, the long-run
estimates and short-run dynamics are very close to the ones obtained for Iran. Therefore,
the results indicate that oil abundance by itself is not a curse.
5 Oil Revenue Volatility and Economic Performance
The above discussion and in particular the empirical analysis in Esfahani et al. (2012b)
strongly suggest that overall oil income has been a blessing for the growth and development
of the Iranian economy. But the positive inuence of oil incomes have often been counteracted
by the adverse e¤ects of excessive volatility of oil revenues and governments inappropriate
responses to it. To investigate the impact of oil price volatility on the Iranian economy
we follow the nance literature and use a measure of realized oil price volatility. See, for
instance, Andersen et al. (2001), Andersen et al. (2003), Barndor¤-Nielsen and Shephard
(2002), and Barndor¤-Nielsen and Shephard (2004). In the nance literature intra-daily data
are generally used to compute daily realized volatilities for asset returns. Here we apply the
same idea and calculate annual volatility using monthly changes in oil prices.14 Our measure
of realized oil price volatility for year t is then given by:
volot =
vuut 12X
=1
 
got;   got
2
(3)
where got; =  ln(P
o
t; ), g
o
t =
1
12
P12
=1 g
o
t; , and g
o
t; denotes the rate of change in oil prices 
P ot;

during month  in year t. The same method is also used to calculate annual volatilities
of oil production and oil revenues. The three series are plotted in Figure 11 from which
we see that oil price volatility was rather small before 1970. This is not surprising as
during this period oil prices were largely regulated by the major international oil companies.
Substantial volatility was rst experienced due to the rst and second oil price shocks after
which volatility continued to remain a major feature of the oil markets. Moreover, with
the OPEC pricing system collapsing in 1985, crude oil prices were instead determined on
international markets, which resulted in further price volatility.
14When available, weekly or daily observations can be used to construct more accurate annual realized
volatility measures. But for the present analysis we do not expect the results to be much a¤ected if instead
of monthly data we used weekly or daily observations.
27
Figure 11: Realized Volatility of Oil Prices, Production, and Revenues, 1957
2010
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Table 4: Realized Volatility of Oil Prices, Production, and Revenues, 19602010
Sample Period Oil Price Oil Production Oil Revenue
Volatility (in %) Volatility (in %) Volatility (in %)
1960 - 2010 20.6 34.8 45.3
-
1960 - 1978 11.3 29.3 35.5
-
1979 - 2010 26.1 38.0 51.1
1988 - 2010 27.9 18.8 35.3
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
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However, the volatility of oil prices was not the only factor impacting the Iranian economy.
The volatility of oil production and exports were also important features of the post 1970
period. In fact, as can be seen from our account of the theoretical growth model for major
oil exporting economies, it is the volatility of export revenues that matters, and seen from
this perspectives it is the combined e¤ects of price and quantity volatilities that should
be considered. Figure 11 shows that although there is a strong co-movement between the
volatilities of oil prices and production, there are also some important short-term deviations.
For instance, production was more volatile between the rst oil price shock and the end of the
Iran-Iraq war, while oil prices have been more volatile since the late 1980s. This is also clearly
illustrated in Table 4, which provides average realized volatilities of the three series calculated
over four sub-periods. In most economies oil price volatility and production/export revenue
volatility are very similar. The reason for this is that production and exports usually remain
reasonably steady over time, with some small year on year changes. However, due to the
political developments in Iran since 1978 the Iranian oil industry has experienced several
supply disruptions and restrictions. First, during the revolution production was halted due
to strike by oil workers. Second, as noted earlier the post revolutionary regime almost halved
the rate of oil production with the aim of stimulating the agricultural sector. Finally, the
Iran-Iraq war meant that exports during certain periods were not possible. Also, sanctions
by the US, and more recently by the European Union, have further added to the volatility
of Irans oil exports, and hence oil revenues.15
Figure 11 and Table 4 both show that starting from 1973, Irans oil revenues have been
extremely volatile, and much more volatile than the volatility of international oil prices.16
Quantitatively, over the period 19602010 the volatility of Irans oil revenues was around
45.3 percent per annum, as compared to the oil price volatility of 20.6 percent per annum
over the same period, see Table 4. This volatility di¤erential although higher during the
revolution and the war period (19791988), has declined signicantly since 1988. Over the
period 19882010, volatility of Irans oil revenues was around 35.3 percent per annum as
compared to the volatility of oil prices of 27.9 percent per annum.
Although oil revenue volatility has dropped since 1988, it still remains well above 35
percent. This is to be compared with the volatility in private consumption which was below
15See also Pesaran (2012) for a discussion on the economic impact of the most recent sanctions, as well as
the article in Farsi by M. H. Pesaran: "Economic Sanctions and the Market Economy" in Donya-e Eqtesad
(November 17, 2012).
16Figure 11 also shows that, except for the rst oil shock in 1974, the realized volatilities of oil revenues
and production are very similar over the period 1957-1985. This is partly due to the fact that oil prices did
not vary much before 1973, and even though oil price volatility started to increase after the rst oil price
shock, the volatility of oil revenues was much more a¤ected by production rather than price volatility.
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7 percent between 1960 and 2007 and dropped even lower post 1988 averaging 3.6 percent.17
Therefore, oil revenue volatility is around 10 times that of consumption volatility.
Figure 12: Scatter Plots of Oil Revenue Growth and Oil Revenue Volatility
Against Real per capita Output Growth, 19572010
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Source: IMF International Financial Statistics.
Comparing the results in Tables 2 and 4 we notice that while there is a positive correlation
between the growth rates of real GDP and oil export revenues, it is also the case that the
sub-periods with higher growth coincide with those of lower oil revenue volatility. To examine
whether oil revenue volatility is a curse for Iran we plot annual observations on real output
per capita growth against oil revenue volatility for the period 19572010. Figure 12 shows
a clear negative relationship between the two variables, with a correlation of -0.62. We
also observe that there is a positive relationship between output and oil revenue growth,
also evident in Figure 4 and Table 2. The existence of a negative relationship between
commodity price volatility and growth has also been documented in Leong and Mohaddes
(2011) and Cavalcanti et al. (2012). Using a panel of 62 primary commodity abundant
countries (including Iran), these papers argue that it is the commodity price volatility, rather
than resource abundance as such, that drives the "resource curse" paradox.
Therefore, while abundance of oil in itself is growth enhancing there are two main prob-
lems with this oil income for the Iranian economy: one is the volatility of oil revenues, and
the second is that it accrues to the government. Because revenues are highly volatile their
management needs appropriate institutions and political arrangements so that the domestic
17As monthly data is not available for consumption, we calculated the annualised consumption volatility
using quarterly observations.
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expenditures from oil revenues become less volatile. The fact that oil revenues accrue to the
government tends to make the government less immediately accountable for their policies
and actions, and increases incentives for rent-seeking activities as discussed in Section 3.3.
However, even if oil income did not accrue to the government, or the government was
politically accountable (as is the case in Norway), excessive revenue volatility might still
be a problem. Therefore, while democracy and accountability are both important, it is also
crucial to have a system in place that deals with adverse e¤ects of excess oil revenue volatility.
Moreover, as already noted, in the case of Iran the unexpected changes in oil revenues tend
to work themselves through the economy rather rapidly. See, for instance, Figure 10 that
shows how quickly the e¤ects of an oil export revenue shock dies out. This is mainly due
to the relative under-development of money and capital markets in Iran, and the countrys
relative isolation from the world economy and nance community. Because of the lack of
shock absorbers, oil revenue volatility has an even bigger impact on the Iranian economy,
which makes having a policy of how to govern the country in terms of dealing with this
volatility even more important.
The establishment of the Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) in Iran, which was approved by
the Iranian parliament in 2000, was an important step towards managing the volatility curse
with the aim of insulating the economy from uctuations in oil prices. However, the adoption
of populist policies since the start of the Ahmadinejad presidency in 2005 resulted in the Fund
being used during good times when oil prices were rising, and was thus rendered ine¤ective
as an instrument of stabilization when oil prices started to collapse in 2009. The OSF was
replaced by the National Development Fund (NDF) in 2011, but it is not clear whether
the NDF is going to be any more e¤ective. Therefore, good institutions and accountable
governments are a prerequisite to creating a mechanism of short-term management of oil
revenue volatility through stabilization funds. However, there needs to be further checks
and balances on how oil incomes are spent and how the OSF is managed.
Finally, it is important to note that the lack of an appropriate mechanism for the manage-
ment of oil revenue volatility can also result in excessive exchange rate volatility, as witnessed
in Iran particularly since the Revolution. We have seen periods of relative stability in the
rate of rial to US dollar punctuated with large devaluations of rial, generally reecting the
di¤erential levels of ination in Iran relative to the rest of the world. We have also seen that
high ination and excess oil revenue volatility both a¤ect output growth negatively, which
harms the competitiveness of the Iranian economy domestically (in the case of imports) and
abroad (in the case of non-oil exports). But such losses in competitiveness do not show
up in the rate of rial to dollar immediately, and their e¤ects work gradually and are often
triggered by some exogenous shock, such as major domestic political developments, military
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treats, or the announcement of new sanctions. The establishment of an e¤ective oil revenue
stabilization fund can therefore also play a crucial role in the stabilization of the rial, which
is a worthy objective in its own right.
6 Concluding Remarks
The historical data presented in this paper show that in terms of maintaining and sustaining
GDP growth, oil income has been a blessing. But it has also been a curse in inducing excess
ination, exchange rate volatility and macro-economic ine¢ ciencies, with adverse political
and institutional implications. The econometric model of the Iranian economy, as developed
in Esfahani et al. (2012b), supports these results and quanties the positive e¤ects of oil
income on growth in the long run. However, it also points to certain ine¢ ciencies in the
demand management of the economy that manifest themselves as a signicantly negative
e¤ect of ination on real output. The estimates also suggest a rather rapid response of
the economy to shocks, which could be due to the relatively underdeveloped nature of the
money and capital markets in Iran. Such markets tend to act as shock absorbers in developed
economies during normal conditions although, as we have seen recently, they can also act as
shock magniers during crisis periods.
We also illustrated the adverse e¤ects of oil revenue volatility on growth in Iran and
showed that not only oil price volatility, but also volatility in production and exports has
remained high over the past fty years. The question is whether we can avoid some of the
undesirable consequences of oil revenue volatility. Norways experience suggests that it might
be possible within a democratic political system with good institutions and an accountable
government. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund, which aims to manage petroleum
revenues in the long term is an example of how a stabilization and sovereign wealth fund
can help o¤set not only the volatility of oil revenues but also help to smooth out government
expenditures.
Appropriate policy responses are needed to deal with the large swings in oil revenues that
Iran has been facing, particularly over the past three decades. In this regard it is crucial that
large swings in government expenditures be avoided, and government nances and private
credit expansion be set at levels that are conducive to relatively low rates of ination. Once
ination is brought under control and it is seen by the public as a credible outcome, we would
expect greater private investment, as well as a more stable currency market with reduced
possibilities for rent-seeking activities.
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